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AN UNSETTLED QUESTION: THE EMERGENCE OF 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION DISCRIMINATION UNDER 
TITLE VII 
by 
David S. Kistler* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Within the last few years, harassment based on gender 
identity (sometimes referred to as sexual orientation or sexual 
preference) has been accepted by some courts as a form of 
sexual discrimination. This is a new development in the law 
and clearly favors those in the transgender community who 
wish to describe themselves as members of the opposite sex. 
The basic issue presented in this paper is whether sexual 
orientation discrimination is included within the boundaries of 
sexual discrimination under Title VII. Title VII of the 1964 
Civil Rights Act states that it is illegal for any employer "to 
discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of ... sex."1 
Serious problems exist since discrimination against 
transgendered individuals appears to be widespread. Mara 
Keisling, the executive director for the National Center for 
Transgender Equality in Washington, D.C. stated, " 'We get 
calls virtually every day from somebody who has been fired 
from his or her job' "2 for having a different sexual orientation 
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than their natural anatomical body. "Each month a 
transgendered person is murdered simply for being 
themselves,"3 and most "will be the target of a hate crime.'.4 
Another problem is that "birth-assigned sex requires a host of 
medical experts to list all of the ways in which the trans gender 
person is gender conforming."5 Emotional difficulties abound 
when a transgendered individual discloses his or her status. 
This paper describes the terms used in sexual 
orientation discrimination claims (Gender Identity Disorder, 
gender, sex, and transgender), the case law prior to the 
acceptance of gender identity discrimination, and the more 
recent case law which allows for a claim of sexual 
discrimination as well as upholds the traditional view. 
II. TERMOLOGY 
Those who have been discriminated against based on 
sexual orientation are sometimes classified as having a mental 
condition defined by psychologists as Gender Identity Disorder 
(GID). This is best described as "persistent feelings of gender 
discomfort and inappropriateness of anatomic sex. "6 The 
American Psychiatric Association's handbook, The Diagnostic 
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), states that 
"there are two components of Gender Identity Disorder."7 The 
first component is that the person must show "strong and 
persistent cross-gender identification. "8 This usually means 
that the person desires to live and dress as a person of the 
opposite sex. The second component is that "there must also 
be evidence of persistent discomfort about one's assigned sex 
or a sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex. "9 
This has been defined as having a "preoccupation with getting 
rid of primary and secondary sex characteristics."10 In other 
words, there is a strong desire to seek sexual reassignment 
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surgery in order to become the other sex. "The exact cause of 
this disorder is unknown."11 
"The term transgender generally refers to a person 
whose 'gender identity or gender presentation falls outside of 
stereotypical gender norms.' " 12 It should be noted that this is 
a very general definition. Opinion exists that there are "many 
different ways in which one can be trans gender." 13 
Even "gender" and "sex" are terms in dispute. Gender 
has been described as "social behavior or norm"14 and thought 
of as a cultural dimension. Sex is generally thought of as a 
person's physical trait. This is an anatomic versus 
psychological bifurcation. The courts, however, have not been 
coherent in applying these terms, and exact definitions have 
been elusive. Even the question of distinguishing between 
gender and sex is open to debate. 
III.SETTING THE STAGE 
Prior to 2001, gender identity sexual harassment claims 
based on Title VII were clearly not accepted by the courts. 
Examples are Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc. 15 and Hamner v. 
St. Vincent Hospital and Health Care Center, Inc.16 The 
traditional view of sexual discrimination dominated 
jurisprudence thinking. Title VII was read from a narrow 
viewpoint and conformed to the traditional male-female 
division of sex. Discrimination on any other basis, such as 
gender identity, was allowed. 
Price Waterhouse, 17 however has been a cause of action 
for sexual orientation discrimination. Although this case has 
nothing to do with gender or sexual orientation discrimination, 
it does concentrate on sexual discrimination in the traditional 
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sense. The court set the stage for an expansion of the view of 
sexual discrimination when it stated that 
"We are beyond the day when an 
employer could evaluate employees by 
assuming or insisting that they matched the 
stereotype associated with their group, for in 
forbidding employers to discriminate against 
individuals because of their sex, Congress 
intended to strike at the entire spectrum of 
disparate treatment of men and women resulting 
from sex stereotypes."18 
After this statement, all federal courts have held that 
sexual stereotyping falls under the umbrella of Title VII. In 
this case the plaintiff, Ann Hopkins, was denied promotion to 
partner due to her non-feminine appearance, behavior, and 
mannerisms. She had preformed very well for the employer 
but was considered" 'overly aggressive, unduly harsh, difficult 
to work with and impatient with staff 'd 9 by the district court 
judge. She filed a Title VII claim against her employer. The 
court stated that "the central point is [that] ... an employer 
may not take gender into account in making an employment 
decision. "20 An exception to this general rule occurs when 
gender is a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). The 
court also stated that sexual stereotyping in and of itself is not 
gender discrimination. "The plaintiff must prove that the 
employer actually relied on her gender in making its 
decision."21 For a cause of action to be upheld, it appears that 
some sort of harm must happen to the plaintiffbased on sexual 
stereotyping. Sexual stereotyping could be defined as fitting 
one into a preconceived category. An example is "requiring 
that a woman wear heels and make-up."22 The Price 
Waterhouse decision appears to open the door to the idea that 
there are a large number of mannerisms that are acceptable. 
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IV. THE EMERGENCE 
Transgender rights under Title VII emerged as an 
evolutionary process starting with reliance on the Price 
Waterhouse decision. The following cases all base their 
opinions favoring transgender rights on this case. 
Nichols v. Azteca Restaurant Enterprises Inc. (256 F.3d 
1131, l01h Cir. 2001) was a case that extended sexual 
harassment to males. In this case Antonio Sanchez acted in an 
effeminate manner and received ongoing abuse from co-
workers and a supervisor. The harassment was persistent. 
After an argument with a manager, the plaintiff walked off the 
job and was fired. A Title VII claim was filed by the plaintiff 
against the employer, and the court stated that "sexual 
harassment is actionable under Title VII to the extent it occurs 
'because of the plaintiffs sex."23 The court considered this 
action a form of discrimination based on stereotyping an 
individual and, relying on Price Waterhouse, found that 
stereotyping is illegal sexual discrimination. In Price 
Waterhouse the woman was thought to be too masculine, here 
a male was thought to be too feminine. Both cases are based 
upon the stereotypical image of an individual founded on their 
anatomical sex at birth. A restriction was put in place since not 
"all gender-based distinctions are actionable under Title VII."24 
An exception was carved out, and the court went on to identify 
dress and grooming codes, which are different for males and 
females, as being acceptable. Although the court declared 
harassment for acting differently came under Title VII, it did 
not state that sexual orientation was within Title VII. 
In Smith v. City of Salem25 the court stated that sexual 
orientation was discrimination based on sex, similar to sexual 
stereotyping. Smith, a firefighter, worked for the city of 
Salem, Ohio and was diagnosed with Gender Identity Disorder. 
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He was employed as a lieutenant and had 7 years of prior 
service without an incident before adopting a more feminine 
appearance and conduct. After an executive meeting, the city 
requested that Smith submit to three psychological evaluations 
from different physicians of the city's choosing. The city 
hoped that he would either resign or not comply, thus 
terminating his employment. The firefighter' s attorney 
contacted the city regarding this matter. Smith then filed a 
complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC) and received a "right to sue" letter in 
return. The city suspended Smith for breach of a City/Fire 
Department policy which was not in effect at the time. At a 
City Civil Service Commission hearing, the chairman refused 
to allow testimony from Smith and upheld the suspension. The 
Columbiana County Court of Common Pleas in Ohio reversed 
the suspension since the regulation was not in effect at the time 
of suspension. Smith then filed suit in federal district court on 
the grounds of sex discrimination and retaliation under Title 
VII and other state claims. District court found for the city 
saying that sexual orientation was not a basis for filing a sexual 
discrimination suit. Smith appealed. 
When Smith appealed court applied the McDonnell-
Douglas rule. This required that "( 1) he is a member of a 
protected group, (2) he suffered an adverse employment action, 
(3) he was qualified for the position in question, and (4) he was 
treated differently from similarly situated individuals outside of 
his protected class."26 The appeals court also stated that four 
elements were required to establish a prima facie case for 
retaliation under Title VII. These were as follows: "(1) he 
[plaintiff] engaged in an activity protected by Title VII; (2) the 
defendant knew he engaged in this protected activity; (3) 
thereafter, the defendant took an employment action adverse to 
him; and (4) there was a causal connection between the 
protected activity and the adverse employment action."27 Only 
-
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the questions of whether Smith suffered an adverse 
employment action and whether sexual stereotyping includes 
sexual orientation were examined by the appeals court. All 
other elements for a prima facie case were found to be 
established. 
The court stated that "sex stereotyping based on a 
person' s gender non-conforming behavior is impermissible 
discrimination. "28 It was also stated that the cause of the 
behavior is immaterial and that labels of an individual are "not 
fatal to a sex discrimination claim. "29 Here the term "non-
conforming behavior" is utilized to make any form of 
discrimination illegal as applied to sexual behavior. It was the 
opinion of the court that labeling someone as "transsexual" 
does not " legitimize discrimination based on plaintiffs 
gender."30 The court stated that Title VII was never meant to 
apply only to the traditional notions of sexual behavior. 
Traditionally, the courts had separated claims under sex or 
biological features from claims under gender or social norm 
behavior. The former were granted protection under Title VII 
and later were not. The appeals court stated that Price 
Waterhouse never intended this type of separation, but that the 
intent of the U.S. Supreme Court in that case was to bar 
discrimination based on sex. The court stated that "employers 
who discriminate against men because they do wear dresses 
and makeup, or otherwise act femininely, are also engaging in 
sex discrimination, because the discrimination would not occur 
but for the victim's sex."31 
This case has opened the door for discrimination claims 
on any potential sexual behavior which the employer criticizes 
as not proper for a male or female. The court did not restrict 
sexual stereotyping to females who act as males but extended 
the concept to all people acting in other than traditionally 
acceptable sexual behavior. 
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Another case from the same circuit that supported 
transsexual rights and followed the Smith decision is Barnes v. 
City ofCincinnati.32 In this case a police officer was denied 
promotion to sergeant based on the fact that the officer was a 
pre-operative male-to-female transsexual. The officer was 
scrutinized more severely than other officers regarding the 
promotion and was the only person denied promotion during 
the probation period between 1993 and 2000. At one point, the 
officer was told "to stop wearing makeup and act more 
masculine."33 The officer filed suit for sex discrimination, and 
the city of Cincinnati objected on the grounds that the officer 
was not a member of any protected class and that a similarly 
situated employee was not identified. Using the quid pro quo 
test for sexual discrimination, the court found that the officer 
was "a member of a protected class by alleging discrimination 
against the city for his failure to conform to sex stereotypes."34 
The court also found that the officer did not have to 
"demonstrate an exact correlation with the employee receiving 
more favorable treatment in order for the two to be considered 
'similarly situated. ' 35 
The officer was never identified as having gender 
identity disorder. Thus, it appears that a trans gender person is 
protected without the need for a psychiatric examination, 
which may be an expansion of Smith. 
Other courts disagree with the traditional view. In 
Schroer v. Billngton,36 the plaintiff applied for a position with 
the Congressional Research Service (part of the Library of 
Congress). After an interview, the plaintiff was offered the job 
and accepted the position. The plaintiff decided to explain ... 
that she was under a doctor's care for gender dysphoria [gender 
identity disorder] and would be presenting herself as a woman 
when she started work. The position offer was rescinded, and 
the plaintiff filed a sex discrimination claim under Title VII. 
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The court stated that "neither the logic nor the language of 
Price Waterhouse establishes a cause of action for sex 
discrimination in every case of sex stereotyping."37 A Title VII 
cause of action is created under sexual stereotyping only when 
disparate treatment occurs. The primary concern by the court 
was the motivation of the defendant. If the plaintiff was 
chastised for not conforming to a male role when perceived to 
be a male or chastised for not conforming to a female role 
when perceived to be a female, then discrimination has 
occurred. 
Traditional courts have held that a distinction exists 
between sexual stereotyping and sexual orientation. The later 
has been considered "a form of discrimination that remains 
outside the settled scope of federal sex discrimination laws."38 
In Schroer, the court felt that it was the time to revisit the 
decision in Ulane. 
In the case of Mitchell v. Axcan Scandipharm, Inc.39 the 
court relied upon Smith, Barnes and Price Waterhouse to 
conclude that a Title VII claim does arise where the plaintiff 
has suffered discrimination due to "plaintiffs appearance and 
gender-related behavior.'.4° The court equated this to sexual 
stereotyping. 
V. CONFUSION AT THE DISTRICT AND APPEALS 
COURT LEVELS 
The traditional view of sexual discrimination is still 
being applied in both the federal district and appeals courts. 
Examples include Kastl v. Maricopa County Community 
College District,41 Etsitty v. Utah Transit Auth.,42 Dawson v. 
Bumble and Bumble43 and Vickers v. Fairfield Medical 
Center. 44 
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In Kastl the plaintiff was diagnosed with Gender 
Identity Disorder and at the time was a pre-operative 
transsexual but" 'functionally living as a female.' "45 The 
court held that the "plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of 
establishing a prima facie case of discrimination because she 
has provided no evidence that she was a biological female and 
member of a protected class while she was employed."46 The 
equation made by the court is that for sexual discrimination to 
be determined for a female there must be the finding of a 
biological female. 
In Etsitty (2005) a pre-operative transsexual individual, 
who had been diagnosed having Gender Identity Disorder, filed 
suit due to termination based on possible liability by the 
employer as to what restroom the employee would use. The 
district court recognized that the 6'h Circuit court decisions of 
Smith and Barnes existed but disagreed with them stating that 
Gender Identity Disorder is a "drastic action'rt7 and not sexual 
stereotyping. The court relied on Ulane. It maintained that the 
Ulane decision meant that sexual discrimination should be 
given an "ordinary common meaning"48 in "that it is unlawful 
to discriminate against women because they are women and 
against men because they are men."49 The district court also 
cited the Congressional intent when it stated: 
From 1981 through 2001, thirty-one proposed 
bills were introduced in the United States Senate 
and the House of Representatives which 
attempted to amend Title VII to prohibit 
employment discrimination on the basis of 
affectional or sexual orientation. None of them 
passed. The rejection of these proposed 
amendments indicates that Congress intended 
the phrase in Title VII prohibiting 
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discrimination on the basis of sex to be narrowly 
interpreted. 
It is interesting to note that the district court went on to 
state that Title VII "should be liberally construed,"50 that the 
issue of Title VII and transgender identity "is a complex 
one, "51 and that "a great deal of tension [exists} ... on the 
issue of whether Title VII applies to transsexuals."52 These 
statements appear to be in conflict with the traditional view. 
In Dawson v. Bumble and Bumble, 53 the appeals court 
stated that discrimination or harassment is not prohibited due to 
sexual orientation and that Title VII "does not recognize 
homosexuals as a protected class."54 The court acknowledged 
the prior Smith decision but gave no analysis of that decision 
except to say that sexual orientation discrimination is clearly 
permissible behavior on the part of an employer because such 
an employee is not part of a protected class (the first 
requirement to show a prima facie case of sex discrimination). 
Both the district court and the appeals courts admitted that the 
distinction between being a woman or man, nonconformance to 
gender norms, and the status of being gay or lesbian are 
"somewhat interrelated protected classes"55 and that "the 
borders [between these classes] are so imprecise."56 Even 
though the appeals court stated that these behaviors would blur 
together, it still held to a clear distinction that sexual 
stereotyping was protected under Title VII and sexual 
orientation was not. 
The Vickers case presents the most confusing opinion 
against sexual orientation discrimination. Vickers was a 
private police officer who filed suit against Fairfield Medical 
Center and others for a variety of claims including sexual 
orientation discrimination under Title VII. First, the district 
court held "that Title VII did not protect individuals from 
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discrimination based on sexual orientation. "57 Second, the 
court stated that the behavior upon which harassment was 
based was "the employee's perceived homosexuality, rather 
than based on gender non-conformity."58 Vickers supplied the 
court with a complaint that had extensive details showing that 
he was harassed at work. The district court held that the 
"behavior which the employee claimed .. . was not behavior 
observed at work or affecting his job performance."59 Vickers 
appealed and the gth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in a 
terse opinion. The Smith decision was made after the district 
court made its opinion but before the appeals court affirmed the 
decision. The majority opinion in Vickers did not mention the 
Smith case. Only the dissent cited Smith claiming that sexual 
orientation was not covered under Title VII. 
VI. ANALYSIS 
The idea that discrimination is illegal due to sex has 
been long established by case law and by statutes. This has 
now been applied to sexual orientation and individuals with 
gender identity disorder. Perhaps an explanation for the 
traditional view is that the idea of adopting a different sex from 
one's anatomical birth sex is the belief that it is morally wrong. 
Even the American Psychiatric Association recognizes gender 
identity disorder in the DSM as a mental disorder or illness.60 
These attitudes have been criticized as regressive jurisprudence 
where the court holds a rigid vision of what sex and sexuality 
are. Until 2000, the courts used the doctrine of protected 
classes to "affirm and strengthen traditional sex and gender 
roles that fail to account for the wide spectrum of sexual 
difference[s]."61 With Smith, Barnes, and Schroer the door has 
been opened to punish those who discriminate based on any 
form of sex. 
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The differentiation between sexual stereotyping and 
sexual orientation remains blurred. Some courts state that 
"gender identity and/or expression are distinct from sexual 
orientation."62 The court in Smith found that using labels, such 
as transgender, to describe a person did not prohibit a claim of 
sex discrimination. The limits of the decision from Smith are 
in limbo as many questions remain unanswered. Will this 
decision allow a male to female (or female to male) 
preoperative transgender person from dressing and acting as a 
female (or male), going to work on a regular basis dressed as 
such, or using the women's (or men's) restrooms? 
The basic question that must be answered is whether 
sexual orientation discrimination is truly discrimination? Title 
VII was created to eradicate sexual discrimination. Why is 
sexual orientation discrimination allowed at all? Why are 
transgender individuals punished for not conforming to 
traditional societal viewpoints regarding sex? Courts on both 
sides of the issue cite the intent of Congress. The traditional 
view points out that sexual orientation has never been accepted 
or enacted into law as a protected class. The modern view cites 
the opinion of Price Waterhouse since "Congress intended to 
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment."63 Courts 
with a traditional viewpoint, as in the Etsitty decision, 
acknowledged a legal problem concerning the usage of the 
narrow definition of sex discrimination. 
Even with the concept that sexual orientation falls 
under Title VII, numerous questions still exist: What is the 
difference between physical sex and sexual orientation? 
Should there be a difference between the two? Should the 
transgendered individual be allowed insurance and medical 
coverage? What role, if any, does a psychological examination 
and determination of Gender Identity Disorder have to do with 
Title VII sexual orientation claims? Should GID be a standard 
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before sexual orientation discrimination is allowed? Although 
some courts have mentioned that the plaintiff has been 
diagnosed with GID, no court has held it to be a prerequisite 
for discrimination. How is record keeping handled concerning 
name, sexual classification, and social security? Should 
transgendered individuals be allowed to use the restroom, 
locker room, or the residence hall of their choice? What 
happens to the dress codes that require men to wear only suits 
and women to wear either skirts or dresses? Is this not sexual 
stereotyping? A standard of professional attire would appear 
more appropriate and be gender neutral. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The federal courts are starting to recognize the fact that 
discrimination based on sex is illegal in all its forms. Also, "a 
growing number of states and localities have enacted laws 
prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation."64 To 
simply state that discrimination is allowed because of a label 
(such as transsexual) placed on a person defies logic and the 
true intent of Title VII prohibition against sexual 
discrimination. The courts must interpret the law to prohibit 
discrimination no matter what its form or classification. 
"Many employers have also begun to address discrimination 
against transgender workers."65 Perhaps the entire concept of 
sexual orientation discrimination is best stated as a warning: 
"No one will have their gender rights secure until the entire 
gender galaxy ... have rights and protections."66 
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The Enron, WorldCom, Adelphia, and other corporate 
scandals gave rise to the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(SOX) in 2002. 1 This legislation seeks to change corporate 
culture and significantly improve the reliability of financial 
reporting by corporate CEOs and CFOs. The Act, however, 
created a number of problems including the enormous costs of 
compliance with the Act, particularly with companies whose 
incomes were borderline or below profitability. Significant 
conflicts with the laws and regulations of other advanced 
countries also exist. Section 404 of the Act, for example, 
requires that the company document everr internal and external 
process that affects corporate earnings. Estimated costs for 
compliance exceed $4.6 million for companies with over $5 
billion in revenues and medium-size companies are expected to 
incur approximately $2 million for compliance.3 The EU 
adamantly stated that its regulations and the actions of member 
states protect shareholders and, therefore, SOX's extension of 
the Act to foreign companies is unwarranted. 
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